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Abstract 
 
 On May 1st 2004, Poland entered the European Union (EU), introducing new 
variables into the domestic politics of the Polish Republic. Since gaining its 
independence from Soviet control in 1989, Poland’s political landscape can be described 
as a dynamic and ever changing force towards democratic maturation. With the accession 
of Poland to the EU, questions of European integration and Europeanization have arisen, 
most specifically with how these two processes effect and shape the behaviors of 
domestic political actors.  
With Poland entering its second decade of EU membership, this study attempts to 
explain how, and if, further European integration has had any effect on the 
Europeanization of political parties in Poland. Building upon the work of various 
scholars, most notably Aleks Szczerbiak, this study examines the years 2009-2014, and 
the examines Poland’s political parties through Robert Ladrech’s framework of 
Europeanization.  
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Introduction  
 
 On May 1st, 2014, The Republic of Poland celebrated its tenth anniversary as a 
member of the European Union (EU). The accession of Poland to the EU ended a fifteen-
year effort of membership aspirations and signaled another transformative change to 
Poland’s political system. Poland’s accession to the EU can be seen as the culmination of 
a transitional political effort decades in the making. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, Poles 
took the streets in protest and civil unrest aimed at resisting the communist Polish United 
Workers’ Party (PZPR). The unrest led to the introduction of martial law from 1981-
1983. In 1989, the communist government of Poland sat down with leaders of the 
Solidarity Movement which led to the Round Table Agreement, ushering in the first open 
and free elections in Poland since before World War II, culminating in Poland’s 
independence from the USSR and the creation of the modern Republic of Poland in 
December of 1990. In the 25 years since Poland become a democratic republic, Poland’s 
political and party system has been of dynamic transformation, as the republic matured 
into a democracy. EU membership has been just another facet of that transformation.  
The purpose of this study is to see what, if any, effects EU membership has on 
political party systems in member states. Specifically, this study will look at how further 
integration with the EU has effected political parties in Poland. This study will examine 
political parties in Poland from 2009 to 2014, and build upon the work of various 
scholars. The aim is to see whether so called “Europeanization” exists, what its effects on 
political party behavior are, and whether EU membership is a new political cleavage in 
Poland. Chapter 1 examines the theoretical issues and a framework of what political 
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parties are, and explains Poland’s political and party system. Chapter 2 examines the 
issues of European Integration and Europeanization, specifically, outlining what EU 
integration is and attempting to define the phenomenon of ‘Europeanization’. Chapter 2 
also discusses previous research on the Europeanization of political parties in Europe and 
Poland in the first five years of EU membership. Finally, Chapter 3 will examine Polish 
party behavior between 2009 and 2014, and examine if there has been a Europeanization 
effect on the parties.  
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Chapter 1- Political Parties 
 
 The following chapter will look at the theoretical underpinnings of what a 
political party is and attempt to find a definition of political parties to use as a guide for 
this study. The second part of the chapter will examine the dynamic changes that created 
the political and party system in Poland since the end of communist rule in 1989.  
Defining Political Parties  
  
Explaining what a political party is with one specific definition is not an easy 
task. Attempts to define what a political party is, have been an elusive puzzle for political 
science scholars. As Henry Steele Commager wrote, “It is easier to say what a party is 
not than to say what it is” (Commager 1950, 309). The study of political parties has come 
from a multitude of scholars. The sheer breadth of political party study has evolved over 
the many decades of scholarship, changing to better reflect the true meaning of a political 
party and its functions.  
The study of political parties is a corner stone topic of political science research. 
Early scholars of political parties struggled to define what they were and what their true 
functions were. Robert Michels, writing about his experiences with the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany, famously wrote, “who says organization, says oligarchy”, 
finding an incompatibility of democracy with large scale social organizations (Michels 
1949, 32). Michels viewed political parties as oligarchical associations, which inherently 
would lead the party to be a reflection not of its constituents, but of the bureaucratic elites 
in charge of the party. Anthony Downs and Leon Epstein similarly studied political 
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parties, focusing attention on parties as being teams seeking control of the governing 
apparatus. Downs wrote that the primary concern of party members is to be elected. 
Downs stated that parties formulated policies to win elections, rather than winning 
elections to formulate policies.  (Downs 1957, 25-28). “The party which runs [the] 
government manipulates its policies and actions in whatever way it believes will gain it 
the most votes without violating constitutional rules” (Downs 1957, 30-31). Leon Epstein 
studied parties not from their structural development, but from their functions. Epstein 
stated that parties developed primarily on a basis of electoral function. Similar to Downs, 
Epstein concluded that a party’s function was to elect government office holders under a 
specific label (Epstein 1967).  
Downs and Epstein can be categorized as being part of the competing teams 
conception to the study of political parties. In their view, electoral victory is the key to 
understanding political parties. This conception of political parties is one of many that 
encompass the overall study of political parties. JP Monroe explained the study of 
political parties as falling into two broad categories. The first, “conceptualizes the party 
as an organized expression of citizens to alter the balance of power in the formal 
institutions of government” while in the second approach, “the party is an institution 
through which elites coordinate their activity as they attempt to satisfy the interests of 
their supporters” (Monroe 2001, 16-17). From these two approaches, Monroe identified 
the two main conceptions of political parties that have arisen through time. The 
competing teams conception, as illustrated by Downs and Epstein, begins any definition 
of a political party within the premise that parties are distinguished by their capacity to 
contest and win elections. In addition to Downs and Epstein, scholars such as Edward 
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Sait, Austin Ranney, and E.E. Shattshneider fall into this approach of political party 
study. These authors identified electoral struggle and the competition between parties as 
the paramount of function and motivation of parties (Monroe 2001, 19-21).   
The organizational conception attempts to define parties by how they are 
organized. Michels earlier mentioned work, was an early example of an organizational 
definition of political parties. One of the most important contributions to the study of 
parties came from Maurice Duverger, who was the first to develop the idea that a political 
party “is a community with a particular structure” (1954, xv). Within this conception, 
parties are defined by their organization and structures, that without these attributes they 
would cease to be parties at all. The organizational conception of parties is perhaps the 
most varied and expansive approach to defining parties. Numerous scholars, from 
Michels to Duverger, to Samuel Eldersveld, have broadened this approach to studying 
political parties. The organization of structures, from the interaction of party elites, 
members, and voters, to the leadership structure of the parties, views the party as an 
institution with structure that guides its actions and the actions of its participants (Monroe 
2001, 21-29).  
The two conceptions of political parties as defined by Monroe might have their 
critics. However, they do highlight important features of political parties. The competing 
teams conception highlights the central feature of parties; “they are the only groups that 
contest elections…whatever else parties do, they do as a consequence of the electoral 
requirement” (Monroe 2001, 21). The importance of the organizational concept of 
political parties is that it gives a clearer meaning to what a political party actually is. 
“Party organization is the institutional consequence of the deliberate coordination of 
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activity to win public office in the party’s name. Party organization is an institution 
organized to capture public office” (Monroe 2001, 17). The dual conceptions of 
organization and competition, allow for a clear definition of political parties.  
  
Samuel J. Eldersveld’s work in party politics and behavior combined the two 
conceptions outlined by Monroe. Eldersveld built upon the ideas and definitions of those 
scholars that came before him to thoroughly define political parties. Eldersveld did not 
conceptualize parties solely on the basis of electoral competition. Nor did he see the party 
as strictly a tool of political elites to gain office. Rather, Eldersveld analyzed parties and 
their structures from the elites to the masses. Eldersveld expanded the definition of party 
elites, to include not just those seeking to hold office, but also those who worked for the 
party. The importance of those he called the ‘party activists’, members of the party who 
hold important positions, have roles of influence, and who exercise important functions in 
the party. He purposely broadened the definition of party elites to underscore the 
importance of these activists in the party. “The party activist cadre keep the party an 
organizational reality and do thus contribute significantly both to party system survival 
and to party system adaptation to new social forces” (Eldersveld 1989, 14). Eldersveld’s 
broadening of the definition of party elites is important because it helped move away 
from oversimplifying the purpose and characterization of party elites and signifying the 
importance of party membership as a whole.  
Eldersveld found that with an expanded definition of party elites, party structure 
and purpose became clearer. In opposition to Michels’ Iron Law and the oligarchical 
tendencies of party elites, Eldersveld found that three theoretical constructs emerged in 
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regards to parties. First, parties had to be understood to be permeable and adaptive, 
always open for new membership, not only at the base level in regards to new party 
activists to do party work, but also with non-activist supporters. Also, the party is open at 
the elite level, if such a strategy will profit the parties aspirations. Second, because parties 
are a structural system seeking to translate social and economic interests into political 
power, it inevitably becomes a conflict system (Eldersveld 1968, 44-47). Finally, 
Eldersveld found that party power and structure is not hierarchical. Rather it is defined by 
what he called stratarchy. Stratarchy refers to the “proliferation of the ruling group and 
diffusion of power prerogatives and exercise. Rather than a centralized ‘unit of 
command’… ‘strata commas’ exist which operate with a varying, but considerable degree 
of, independence” (Eldersveld 1968, 49). The idea of stratarchy is vital to understanding 
Eldersveld’s definition of political parties, because unlike scholars that came before him, 
he focused on party activists, or members, as a whole, and their functions within the 
party.  
Generally speaking, definitions of political parties include some mention of the 
party as a ‘social’ group. The characterization of political parties as more than factions, 
voting blocs, or interest groups, comes down to the fact that there is a large social 
component to political parties. And this social component is important to understanding 
how tradition, history, and socio-economic factors shape party interests, positions, and 
conflict. The base membership of the party, what Eldersveld referred to as “the critical 
action locus of the party”, drives parties as they enter into electoral conflict, and 
personifies the social dimension of political parties (Eldersveld 1964, 9). From these 
theoretical constructs, a clear and concise definition of political parties emerges.  
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The political party is a social group, a system of meaningful 
and patterned activity within the larger society. It consists of a 
set of individuals populating specific roles and behaving as 
member-actors of a boundaried and identifiable social unit. 
Goals are perceived by these actors, tasks are assigned for and 
by them, and communication channels are maintained 
(Eldersveld 1968, 42).    
 
This definition is a vital guide to understanding the nature of political parties in Poland. 
Poland’s Communist history still casts a long shadow on its political parties. Employing 
Eldersveld’s definition of a political party, especially his emphasis on broadening the 
sense of party elites, helps to understand how Poland’s political parties are organized, 
gain support, and survive electoral competition.  
The purpose of this study is to examine whether EU membership and integration 
has become a realigning or political cleavage in regards to party politics. In Patterns of 
Democracy, Arend Lijphart introduced seven issue dimensions of partisan conflict. These 
seven issues areas were, (1) socio-economic, (2) religious, (3) cultural-ethnic, (4) urban-
rural, (5) regime support, (6) foreign policy, and (7) post-materialist issues (Lijphart 
1999, 79). The issues of EU membership and Europeanization would fall into the ‘foreign 
policy’ dimension. Poland’s pre-communist history continues to shape political conflict 
and party behavior to this day. To fully understand whether Polish political parties have 
been undergoing a process of Europeanization or whether EU integration has been a 
salient issue dimension for Poland’s political parties, the foundation and current state of 
party politics must first be explored. The following section is a brief synopsis of the birth 
and history of Poland’s political parties since 1989 and summarize Poland’s current 
political party field. Poland’s political and party system is one of the most unique of the 
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post-communist democracies of Europe. Born out of compromise and molded by decades 
of political fighting and fine-tuning, Poland’s party system is one of stability and 
continuity, unlike many party systems in former communist states.   
Poland’s Political and Party System  
 
 Poland’s path to democracy started with the conclusion of the 1989 Roundtable 
Talks between the PZPR (the communist Polish United Worker’s Party) and 
representatives of the Solidarity Movement. Political change and the transition to 
democracy in Poland happened more swiftly than anyone could have anticipated. The 
bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks were started with the support of the 
leadership in Moscow. Throughout the 1980s, discontent with the communist party 
reached a fever pitch. Mass strikes orchestrated by Solidarity movement, the imposition 
of marshal law, and an economic downturn were all factors that led to the Roundtable 
Talks. In 1986, after Mikhail Gorbachev announced his policies of glasnost (openness) 
and perestroika (restructuring), the scene was set and the PZPR’s hand was forced to 
enter in negotiations with Solidarity to avoid further domestic turmoil. (Kaminski 1999, 
83-85).    
 Even with a green light from Moscow in support of liberalization, the leaders of 
the PZPR entered the Roundtable Talks not expecting a transition to democracy. Rather, 
the PZPR entered the negotiations expecting to give some concessions to its opposition, 
while still maintaining its power. The PZPR believed that it could incorporate a carefully 
crafted and well-organized political opposition into the government, while still 
maintaining control. In doing so, the PZPR made two mistakes that led to the end of 
communist rule in Poland. First, the PZPR had overestimated its support with the public. 
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Focusing on public opinion surveys conducted by the Center for Public Opinion (CBOS), 
the PZPR felt that it enjoyed a great deal of support from the public. Its second mistake, 
came during the actual talks, in which the PZPR agreed to a single-member district 
majority runoff as electoral law.  
Concluding the talks was the signing of the Roundtable Compact. The first semi-
free elections since before WWII were scheduled for June 1989, with thirty-five percent 
of the lower house seats (Sejm) and one hundred percent of the higher house (Senate) 
seats to be freely elected. A simple majority in the Sejm would select the Premier (Prime 
Minister). In addition, a strong presidency would be created, with the candidate for 
President elected with a simple majority by both houses (Kaminski 1999, 83, 88-89). The 
political system created was a variation of what Maurice Duverger described as ‘semi-
presidential’, in which there is a president elected by universal suffrage, given 
considerable powers, who coexists within a government that rests on the confidence 
placed in a separately elected parliament (Duverger 1980, 165-167). This semi-
presidential system was created during the bargaining process as a compromise between 
both sides. As Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey described this transition, “the 
establishment of a presidency initially reserved for the outgoing dictator but subsequently 
to be an elective position could be seen as an ingenious form of conflict resolution. The 
Polish bargainers set aside a presidency to provide assurances to the defeated forces of 
the old regime while leaving primary legislative responsibility to a more democratically 
endowed parliament and a government responsible thereto” (Shugart and Carey 1992, 
285).  
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The June elections surprised both the PZPR and Solidarity. Solidarity won all of 
the freely elected seats it was entitled to in the Sejm, and 99 out of the 100 seats in the 
Senate, giving it blocking capacity. The PZPR won 37.6% of its allotted 65% of seats in 
the Sejm, with the rest going to its puppet satellite parties and “catholic-Marxist” parties 
under communist control. The PZPR’s underestimation of its popularity was a shock to 
its members. This coupled with the weakness of the electoral law, through the majority 
run off system, allowed Solidarity much greater power than the PZPR had anticipated 
(Kaminski 1999, 89, 95-96). The PZPR did not want to give any leadership roles, the 
presidency nor the premiership, to any member of the opposition. They believed that they 
would be able to placate the opposition by giving Solidarity several cabinet posts under 
the prime minister. On July 19th, General Wojciech Jaruzelski was elected President with 
a majority of only one vote, and nominated General Czeslaw Kiszczak to the 
premiership. However, Solidarity leaders were able to convince the PZPR’s communist 
allies, the United Peasant Party (ZSL) and the Democratic Party (SD), to turn on the 
PZPR and form a new coalition. The PZPR became the minority party, and the new 
coalition government selected opposition activist Tadeusz Mazowiecki as the new 
premier (Wrobel 2010, 273-275). The path to democracy was set. In December of 1989, 
the Sejm approved government and economic reforms, as well as changes to the 
constitution that would lead Poland to democracy. In January of 1990, the PZPR 
dissolved itself ending over forty years of Communist rule in Poland. The first free and 
open elections for the Presidency took place in 1990, with parliamentary elections taking 
place a year later (Castle and Taras 2002, 95-96).             
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 The bargaining process of the Roundtable Talks was a back and forth game 
between the PZPR and Solidarity. What was created is a system that still endures to this 
day, although with some changes. Since the Roundtable Talks, the Constitution of the 
People’s Republic of Poland was amended several times to be more democratic and 
politically and economically liberal. The current Constitution of Poland was adopted in 
April of 1997. The new constitution cut down on the power of the presidency. The 
president is elected by popular vote to a five-year term and is the head of state. The only 
legislative power the president has is the right to veto legislative. However a simple 
majority in the Sejm can override the veto. The prime minster is chosen by the president, 
and is usually the leader of the party that obtained the most seats in the Sejm. The prime 
minister and his chosen cabinet are then appointed through a vote of confidence in the 
Sejm. Members of the Sejm are elected to four-year terms by proportional representation 
using the d’Hondt method, while the Senate is elected by a single member, first past the 
post voting method (Nikolenyi 2014, Sydorchuk 2014). Elections to the EU Parliament 
are conducted by elections in Poland’s thirteen constituencies, with seats allocated by the 
d’Hondt method (European Parliament 2014a).  
 Poland can still be considered a consolidating democracy, still facing many 
challenges as it transforms into a mature democracy (Kunovich 2013, 65). This fact is 
highlighted by the state of political parties in Poland and the way party competition since 
1989 has evolved. The Polish public is highly cynical of political parties and support for 
individual parties is low. Recent public opinion polling shows that only 25% of Poles 
consider any one party to be close to their views, while a majority, 56%, say that no party 
aligns with their views (CBOS 2013a). Turnout for elections are low, especially for 
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legislative and EU Parliamentary election, while presidential elections, where the focus is 
on the individuals running, is somewhat higher. Even with low levels of support, parties 
have thrived and become the de facto mean of interest articulation and aggregation in the 
Polish political system. Though Polish parties have thus far failed to cultivate their 
electorates, because of Polish voters exhibiting low levels of party identification and high 
levels of electoral volatility, Polish parties maintain an effective monopoly on forming 
and shaping political discourse (Jasiewicz 2007, 96-101).  
        In regards to examining the effect that further EU integration has had on 
Polish political parties, the political-social cleavages and issue dimensions that shape 
party behavior have to be explained. The last section of this chapter will highlight how 
parties born in a post-communist state behave and how this past affects the political 
system. In addition to the expected left-right dimensions of party classification, tradition, 
history, and culture are all important factors that shape party behavior in Poland. In order 
to show that EU membership has had any effect on the political parties of Poland, a link 
must be made between EU membership and a change in party behavior.  
Polish Parties and Issue Dimensions  
 
 Several different variables can be linked to the stability of party systems in new 
democracies, such as the permissiveness of electoral institutions, the emergence and 
strength of certain social cleavages, history of the previous regime, and economic 
conditions. However, one area of research into party systems of post-communist states 
that also can be an important variable of stability is that of party organization. Margit 
Tavits found that in post-communist states in Central and Eastern Europe, party 
organizational strength was an important variable in determining electoral success. She 
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found that strong party organization, regardless of party wealth, resources, or popularity 
of party leaders, was an important factor in continued electoral success (Tavits 2013, 67).  
Party organization is an important indicator in examining Polish political parties. 
In new democracies, especially those in post-communist states, Tavits found that party 
competition and party systems were not structured in the same way that they are in more 
advanced democracies. In new democracies, voters lack experience with the functions of 
a democratic electoral system, are less likely to identify with a certain political party, are 
more likely to be confused about the ideological difference between parties, and may 
even be hostile to parties. In addition to these factors, in post-communist democracies, 
the social cleavages arising in the new democracy were not as pronounced or even 
existed under the previous regime. Communist societies were leveled in terms of social 
class, urban-rural differences eliminated, the role of religion largely diminished, and 
ethnic difference suppressed (Tavits 2013, 5-8). Finally, Tavits argued that organizational 
strength was important because it influenced party unity. The stronger the party 
organization, the more valuable party identification becomes in terms of electoral success 
(ibid, 9).  
 These findings are important to understanding the Polish party system. In 1991, 
after the first fully free legislative elections, 29 parties were awarded seats in the Sejm. 
By the next election, only five of those parties had survived to win elections. By the end 
of the most recent elections in 2011, only two of those parties still had seats in the Sejm. 
This volatility in the electoral success of parties underscores the dynamic nature of party 
competition in Poland. However, there are certain elements of the party system that show 
stability and continuity. Regardless of the party composition, all governments since 1989 
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have conducted largely similar domestic and foreign policies. They have developed a 
market economy and pursued the integration of Poland into European and Atlantic 
structures. Secondly, voters seem to be less confused ideologically than party elites, and 
tend to support political parties that are aligned with their political ideologies. Ideologies 
in Poland can be separated into four distinct political fields. The first encompasses voters 
that strongly support secularism and a free market enterprise system, which can be 
described as a liberal democratic field. A combination of pro market reforms and high 
religiosity brings about a Christian Democratic field. Thirdly, support for state 
interventionism and religiosity creates a populist field. Finally, support for state 
intervention and secularism identified as a socialist field. With these four political fields, 
describing Polish party politics through the traditional left-right political dimensions 
obscures party positions in the political field (Jasiewicz 2007, 86-89).  
 Voters preferences and party activity within these four fields, lead to the 
polarization and fragmentation of parties in Poland. Political party positions in these four 
fields are more strongly related to one of these cleavages, and are more ambiguous in 
relation to others. Within this, two major cleavages are salient to the study of party 
politics in Poland. The first is the socio-economic cleavage, and the divide between 
support for neoliberal free market enterprise and the support for state intervention in 
economic matters and welfare-state type social policies. The second is an ideological 
cleavage that can be understood as a choice between different visions of social and 
political order. Included within this cleavage are the issues dividing citizens between 
Poland’s strong Catholic traditionalism, with a strong anti-communist component, and 
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cosmopolitan secularism, with an indifference to Poland’s Communist past (Jasiewicz 
2007, 88, 111-112). 
 These cleavages are most apparent at the party elite level. Every government 
since 1991 can either be described as post-communist or post-opposition, meaning that 
either members or supporters of the communist regime, or those that were members of 
the Solidarity movement formed the majority coalition. This cleavage characterizes the 
left-right dimensions of party politics in Poland, with leftist parties viewed as the 
successors of the communist party and the right wing seen as the successors of the 
Solidarity movement. This divide extends to the public. Even those who were born after 
the fall of communism or took no part in the communist regime are divided based on 
their feelings of Poland’s communist past, and can be placed on the left-right political 
spectrum based on their attitudes (Castle and Taras 2002, 108-113, 161-162). This 
cleavage is also tied to the role of the Catholic Church and religiosity in Poland. Though 
96% of Poles identify as Catholic, the religious cleavage is based on the divide between 
devout Catholics and those in whose lives the church does not play a vital role (Castle 
and Taras 2002, 158).  
 Unlike the political cleavage that results from Poland’s communist past and 
religiosity, economic factors have not been as salient of a cleavage in Polish party 
politics, on either the elite or public level. There has been a lot of continuity in the 
economic policies of every government, regardless of party affiliation. There are 
differences between the left and right parties based within the free-market/welfare state 
dimensions, but they have largely been unchanged by either side. Poles do differ from 
one another in terms of class and occupational differences. The end of communism’s 
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most profound effects were on the working middle class, with the shrinking of the 
manufacturing and industrial sector. Agricultural workers, which constitute one in four 
Poles, have remained largely unchanged since the fall of communism. However, the 
service industry and opportunities for white-collar employment have increased since the 
end of communism. In terms of the political system, factors such as unemployment are 
most critical during elections, while the divide between free market enterprise and social 
policies are not as pronounced (Castle and Taras 2007, 153-155; Jackson et al 2010). 
 Membership in the EU encompasses a wide field of political and economic issues. 
The division of Poland’s political system based on its communist past and religious 
context shapes party behavior and dictates electoral success. The purpose of this study is 
to analyze if, and how, the added dimension of EU membership ads to shaping party 
politics. Chapter two will deal with the issues of European integration and 
Europeanization. It will analyze the theoretical background of what European integration 
and Europeanization is, provide a review of literature on the Europeanization of political 
parties in Europe, and finally summarize the findings of previous scholarly work on the 
Europeanization of political parties in Poland in the first five years of membership.  
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Chapter 2- European Integration and Europeanization  
European Integration 
 
 European integration refers to the process of economic, political, monetary, and 
social integration of the states of the EU. European integration is a process that has been 
evolving since the end of WW II. The aftermath of WWII created staggering economic 
and reconstruction problems. Europe needed help to rebuild itself and a need for stability 
and peace created the conditions for what would become the EU. Through the funds 
provided by the European Recovery Program (ERP), more commonly known as the 
Marshall Plan, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), later 
renamed the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), provided 
a framework for European states to cooperate and integrate across national borders. 
Shortly after the founding of the OEEC, the Council of Europe was created, which would 
lead to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to 
the eventual creation of the EU. The ECSC was the brainchild of Jean Monnet, a French 
civil servant, who believed that economic integration in the coal and steel industrial 
sectors of Europe would to a supranationally regulated market that would encourage 
peace and stability. Monnet presented his vision to French foreign minister Robert 
Schuman, who fought for the creation of the ECSC. In 1951, after the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris, the ECSC was established, setting up an organizational blueprint for the 
future of Europe (Staab 2011, 5-8). 
 European integration would be furthered through the signing of EU Treaties. 
Table 1 shows a summary of EU Treaties, from the establishment of the ESCS in 1951, to 
the signing of the latest EU treaty, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The two forces of 
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intergovernmentalism and supranationalism have defined European integration since 
WWII. Supranationalism refers to the creation of institutions and policies that would 
supersede the power of their national counterparts. Intergovernmentalism envisions 
European integration as a process that minimizes the creation of new institutions and 
policies in favor of conducting integration through a process between national 
governments (Staab 2011, 5-6). This intergovernmental-supranational divide has 
characterized efforts of EU integration since the signing of the Treaty of Paris. 
Inherently, European integration involves national governments voluntarily entering into 
agreements that can put constraints on national sovereignty and the autonomy of national 
governments in favor of joint decision-making and pooled sovereignty between the 
members of the EU (Bache et al 2011, 3,17).     
 
Table 1- Timeline of EU Treaties 
Treaty 
European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) 
Signed 
1951 
Entered into Force 
1952 
European Economic Community (EEC) 1957 1958 
European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM) 
1957 1958 
Single European Act (SEA) 1986 1987 
Treaty on the European Union- 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU) 
1992 1993 
Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 1999 
Treaty of Nice 2001 2003 
Lisbon Treaty 2007 2009 
   (Staab 2011, 9) 
 
 The struggle of whether the European project would result in a supranational 
structure or simply be an intergovernmental project has been a back and forth game 
primarily between elites. Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman envisioned a European 
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community that would be integrated not only economically, but also politically. The 
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, established the European Economic Community 
(EEC) , which sought further economic integration and set an ambitious framework for 
future political integration. However, throughout the 1950s and 60s, efforts for a united 
European Political Community failed. The first blow to this political unification was the 
failure of the French parliament to ratify the proposals of a European Defense 
Community (EDC) in 1952. The incorporation of Western European nations into the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly the addition of West Germany 
in 1955, the idea of the EDC evaporated. In the 1960s, the sovereignty of national 
governments and the will of government leaders further eliminated hopes of political 
integration. Most notably was the so-called “empty chair crisis” in which French 
President Charles de Gaulle, recalled all French Ministers from Brussels. The actions of 
de Gaulle were in response to Walter Hallstein, the president of the European 
Commission, and his plan to introduce majority voting into the EEC (Staab 2011, 9-12).  
  The intergovernmental state of mind in Europe persisted with little variation until 
the 1980s. A significant change occurred in 1979, when Members of the European 
Parliament (MEPs) were directly elected by the citizens of European Community (EC) 
members. Although the European Parliament (EP) had only an advisory role, it did give a 
much needed degree of legitimacy to the EC. The EC project, and European integration, 
was largely seen by the public as an elite-driven process. The election of MEPs by 
citizens finally gave the citizens of the EC a voice and was the start to the elimination of 
a much-perceived democratic deficit in the EC (Staab 2011, 16; Finke 2010, 6-7). 
Supranationalism began to dominate European integration in the 1980s, with the signing 
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of the Single European Act (SEA). The SEA introduced majority voting, eliminating the 
veto power of member states, gave more power to the EP by giving it a voice in 
amending legislation, and also set a deadline for the Single European Market (SEM) to be 
implemented by 1992 (Staab 2011, 18-19).  
The 1990s and the new millennium saw the implementation of four new treaties 
that further integrated Europe, that would see further supranational European integration. 
The fall of the Soviet Union, and the seeking of greater cooperation of the former 
communist satellite states with Western Europe signaled more changes to the structure of 
the EC. The result was the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), also called the 
Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992. The EC was renamed the European Union (EU), gave 
citizens of the EU member states uniform rights, gave even more power to the EP with 
the power to draft legislation, and elevating new policy fields away from national 
governments and to the EU. The Maastricht Treaty created three pillars, the Economic 
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA) pillars. The Economic Community was the greatest achievement in terms 
of supranational governments. It created the single currency, Euro, and the Economic 
Monetary Union (EMU), which created a single monetary policy for all EU members. 
After serious setbacks in ratification of the TEU in Denmark, France, and the UK, the 
second and third pillars of the EU took a more intergovernmental character, as decisions 
regarding the CFSP and JHA had to be undertaken through unanimous decision of 
member states (Staab 2011, 19-23).  
The Treaty of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, and the Treaty of Nice of 2001, further 
tried to increase the supranational powers of the EU. The Treaty of Amsterdam’s most 
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important features were the creation of the Schengen Agreement, which allowed for the 
free movement of people, goods, and services across national borders, created the 
position of the High Representative for the CFSP, and clarified the concept of European 
citizenship. However, the UK, Ireland, and Denmark all received opt-out clauses for the 
Schengen Agreement, cutting down on the power of the treaty. The Treaty of Nice was a 
response to institutional and enlargement challenges facing the EU. The size of the EP 
was capped at 732 MEPs and a new voting formula was introduced in the Council of 
Ministers (the intergovernmental forum for legislative approval). A fundamental rights 
charter however failed to be included as part of the Treaty after UK Prime Minister Tony 
Blair refused to allow the charter to be enforceable in the UK. The Treaty of Nice 
attempted to address some of the undemocratic practices of the EU and eliminate the 
democratic deficit. However, unanimous voting was still a part of many policy areas, 
such as taxes, the CFSP, and JHA (Staab 2011, 23-27).  
The most recent EU treaty was the Lisbon Treaty, ratified in 2009. The Lisbon 
Treaty came as a result of the failure to ratify a Constitution of Europe. Spain and Poland 
refused to ratify the Constitution, on the grounds that it would give them a smaller voice 
in terms of voting rights. The Lisbon Treaty was a water-downed form of the 
Constitution. New institutional mechanism, such as an increase in MEPs to 750 and the 
extension of an equal partnership between the EP and Council of Ministers on approving 
legislation were ratified with the treaty. The Three Pillars of the Maastricht Treaty were 
eliminated, and the European integration project was put under the umbrella of the EU. 
Power of review of EU legislation was also given to national assemblies, which could 
send legislative back to the Commission if one third of assemblies voiced concerns. The 
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EU’s powers also grew greater in terms of its role as a supranational institution. The 
European Court of Justice was given authority to rule over JHA issues and allowed to 
overrule national courts within this domain. The Treaty of Lisbon also created new 
offices, the President of the European Council and the High Representative for Common 
and Security Policy. Although some member states, such as the UK and Ireland were able 
to negotiate opt-out clauses to certain features of the treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon 
strengthened the EU as a supranational organization. Unanimous approval was eliminated 
on most all policy areas, except for defense and taxation (Staab 2011, 27-30).  
Since 1986, the treaties of integration have propelled the EU into a strong 
supranational institution. Although there have been setbacks in terms of government opt-
outs for certain EU measures, the treaties have overall strengthened the EU as a united 
entity in the global world. A further development of the treaties has been a greater voice 
for the citizens of the EU. Once considered an elite project, European integration has 
been largely impacted by the citizens of the EU. In addition to the direct election of 
MEPs, the use of national referendums has been an area that has effected integration and 
changed its scope. Since 1972, there have been over forty referendums held on various 
aspects of European integration, with the majority of referendums held on the issues of 
EU membership and candidacy (Hobolt 2009, 7-11; European Election Database).  
The prevalence of referendums on European integration has opened up research 
opportunities attempting to explain how citizens of the EU vote in these referendums. 
Sara Binzer Hobolt studied the voting behaviors and patterns of EU citizens during 
referendums on European integration. She found that voters take into consideration a 
broad spectrum of issues related to European integration. They often make choices 
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between their perceived benefits and costs of accepting proposals that may take powers 
from the nation state, and weighing them against the dangers of rejecting a proposal that 
could leave their country on the sideline of the EU. Furthermore, she found that voters in 
many cases to look to parties in deciding how they will vote. The information given to 
voters by parties can shape the outcome of a vote. Voters also look at cues given to them 
by parties in deciding whether to vote yes or no on a referendum (Hobolt 2009. 233-249).  
  Public opinion and the preference of voters also have an effect on parties and 
their positions on European integration. As European integration has evolved through the 
various treaties, the way party elites and government leaders frame their positions on 
European integration has also changed. Prior to the Maastricht treaty, the interests of the 
most powerful domestic producers were identified as the most relevant to understanding 
the origins of governmental positions on integration. In particular, the divide between the 
powerful industrial sectors of the north and powerful agricultural sectors of the south 
framed positions on integration. As the agenda of EU treaties shifted from economic to 
political integration and institutional reforms, governmental positions on integration 
shifted as well. Post Maastricht, positions on integration became more heavily contested 
at the domestic level, as voters’ participation and interest in EU politics has been steadily 
increasing. Conventional wisdom used to dictate that member states that received the 
greatest benefits from EU membership, either through the common market or as 
beneficiaries of EU funds, were the greatest supporters of further integration. However, 
studies have shown that this is not the case. Rather, governments have increasingly 
looked at public opinion and support of integration of its citizens to craft their positions 
(Finke 2010, 134-145). 
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Increased importance of EU politics as the domestic levels, as well as the greater 
incorporation of the citizenry of the EU into the mechanism of integration has shaped the 
integration process. One of the chief issues that have arisen with further European 
integration has been that of Europeanization. Europeanization, sometimes referred to as 
Europeanism, is the result of European integration. With increased integration, questions 
of Europeaness and notions of a European identity arise. This issue is a polarizing divide 
in the politics of the EU. The following section will define Europeanization and its 
importance in terms of European integration and its effects on the political and party 
systems of member states. 
Europeanization Defined 
 
 Defining and conceptualizing Europeanization is a monumental task. The term 
has been used in scholarly work since at least the 1990s. However, the term 
Europeanization has fallen victim to either being under-theorized or conceptually 
confused. In order to fully grasp the meaning of Europeanization and understand its 
effects on political parties, the concept has to be defined for the purpose of this study.  
   John Gerring identified a criterial framework for understanding how to form a 
new concept. He argued that for a concept to be sound, it has to have three elements. The 
first is extension, or the events or phenomena to be defined. The second, intension, refers 
to the properties that distinguish one concept from another. Thirdly, the term, or the label 
that covers the first two elements (Gerring 1999, 357-358). In addition to these three 
elements, Gerring also offered an eight-part ‘criteria of conceptual goodness’. This 
criteria included; familiarity, resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, 
theoretical utility and field utility (Table 2 explains each of the criteria) (ibid, 367-368). 
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Following Gerring’s framework, a definition of Europeanization can be constructed, that 
is not under-defined or conceptually stretched. This eight-part framework provides a 
readily available schema from which someone is able to easily judge the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of a concept. Familiarity, the degree to which a new definition 
makes sense or is clear, so that it can be fully understood. Resonance, or what Gerring 
referred to as the ‘cognitive click’, gives the new concept power. Parsimony is the sign of 
a good concept, in that its definition is not endless, and that the concept should be able to 
be described with only a few attributes. Coherence is the sense in which the attributes and 
the definition of the concept belong to one another. Differentiation is important to a good 
concept because it gives clarity to the concept apart from already existing concepts. 
Depth of concept is vital to understand the instances/characteristics that bundle under the 
umbrella of the concept. Finally, theoretical utility refers to the concept’s ability to help 
in the development and formation of theses, while field utility ensures that the concept 
causes the least amount of disruption in the ‘semantic field’ (Gerring 1999, 368-384).      
 
Table 2- Gerring’s Criteria of Conceptual Goodness 
1. Familiarity 
2. Resonance 
How familiar is the concept? 
Does the chosen term ring (resonate)? 
3. Parsimony How short is a) the term and b) its list of defining attributes (the 
intension)? 
4. Coherence How internally consistent (logically related) are the instances 
and attributes? 
5. Differentiation How differentiated are the instances and the attributes (from 
other most-similar concepts)? How bounded, how 
operationizable, is the concept? 
6. Depth How many accompanying properties are shared by instances 
under definition? 
7. Theoretical Utility How useful is the concept within a wider field of interest? 
8. Field Utility How useful is the concept within a field of related instances and 
attributes? 
(Gerring 1999, 367).  
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 Using these criteria of conceptual goodness, many present ideas and definitions of 
Europeanization can be dismissed. Some definitions of Europeanization have referred to 
it as the development of institutions of governance at the European level (Cowles et al, 
2001, 3), others have defined is as the distinct forms of governance that have been 
exported outside of Europe’s boundaries (Cole and Drake 2000, 27), or that the concept 
refers to an idea of identity and post-modern values that are unique to Europe 
(McCormick 2007, 166). However the problems with these definitions is that they do not 
adequately describe Europeanization. The first definition refers to the process of 
European integration, the second explains the process of ‘policy transfer’, while the third 
definition explains one side of post-modern values, that could be extended easily outside 
of Europe. Europeanization is more concrete than a set of values, more intensive than the 
export of policies, and goes beyond simple matters of integration. Europeanization has to 
be thought of as a stand-alone process as a result of European integration, in which EU 
governance and institutions have transformed the domestic policies of member states.  
 Claudio Radaelli presents one of the most commonly cited definitions of 
Europeanization, which also fulfills Gerring’s criteria of a good concept. He defines 
Europeanization as “processes of  (a) construction, (b) diffusion, and (c) 
institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
and ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and 
consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national) discourse, political structures, and public policies” (Radaelli 2000, 4). Radaelli 
also further states what Europeanization is not. Europeanization is not a convergence, of 
 28
policy or otherwise, between the bodies of EU governance and domestic governing 
bodies. Although convergence is possible, Europeanization can produce divergence. 
Radaelli also makes a clear distinction between European integration and 
Europeanization. Europeanization is not political integration, but rather Europeanization 
is a consequence of integration (ibid). This definition is especially important for the 
course of this study, as it focuses on how the process of Europeanization is incorporated 
into the domestic politics of member states.  
 With a working definition of Europeanization at hand, how can scholars be sure 
that Europeanization does affect domestic politics, or party politics? Robert Ladrech 
introduced an analytical framework that has been employed by numerous scholars to 
investigate whether there is a Europeanization effect on member states’ political parties. 
Ladrech stated that the primary task for the analyst is to “…trace changes back to an EU 
source, or else to recognize an intended use of the EU as a possible aid in the resolution 
of an issue, or to evaluate the problems that the presence of the EU issue presents for 
parties” (Ladrech 2002, 396). Ladrech identified five areas of investigating the effect of 
Europeanization on political parties.  
The first was Programmatic change, citing that the most explicit type of evidence 
of Europeanization will lie in the modifications of political party programs. This can be 
measured quantitatively by the increased mention of the EU in electoral programs and 
references tying the EU to policy areas normally considered to be of a domestic arena, 
such as unemployment. Qualitatively, references to the EU as a factor in pursuing 
national policies, references to transnational organizations and EP party federations, as 
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well as mention of EU institutions, can all signal a Europeanization effect on parties 
(Ladrech 2002, 396-397).  
Secondly, organizational change, through the affiliation of parties with European 
level institutions and organizational links with actors outside of the domestic arena, can 
signal the Europeanization of political parties. This can include the incorporation of 
references to a party’s respective transnational party federation, or domestic party leaders 
entering EU institutions (Ladrech 2002, 397). Third, patterns of party competition can 
also be investigation for possible Europeanization. This refers to the extent that the EU 
itself becomes politicized in national elections and politics, and the way in which parties 
seek new voters by using an either anti- or pro-EU position (ibid). The fourth part of the 
framework, party-government relations, refers to the party-government relations on EU 
matters. Parties may either be pushed or pulled by EU issues. A government can be 
pushed by a party to maximize positions close to the party program, or pulled by parties 
to distance themselves from positions of institutional change, if national sovereignty 
could be undermined (ibid, 398). Finally, the fifth part of the framework refers to the 
relations beyond the national party system. Europeanization could have an effect on the 
transnational cooperation of parties from different EU member states to the extent that 
new organizational and programmatic activities are promoted (ibid, 399). An example of 
this would be two Christian Democratic Parties having regular meetings on EU policies. 
With this five-point framework in mind, party systems of EU member states can be 
analyzed and a Europeanization effect found. Ladrech’s framework is one that has been 
employed by several scholars and will also be employed as part of this study.         
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 Having a working definition of Europeanization and a working analytical 
framework to study political parties, the final sections of this chapter will examine 
evidence of the Europeanization of political parties. The next section will explore 
previous scholarly work on the Europeanization of political parties in EU member states, 
and will look specifically at the evidence of Europeanization of Polish political parties 
between the years 2004-2009.  
Europeanization of Political Parties; Poland 2004-2009 
 
 The effect of European integration on the Europeanization of political parties can 
be understood through two related dimensions. On one hand, Europeanization can be 
viewed as having a shaping effect on parties. As Europe becomes a more important issue 
in domestic politics, parties are forced to take positions on European issues, policies, and 
developments. On the other hand, Europeanization has a strategic dimension, in that 
parties may seek to use Europeanization as a political strategy (Hepburn 2010, 12). Eve 
Hepburn’s research on the Europeanization of political parties focused on how regional 
parties in Sardinia, Bavaria, and Scotland responded to European integration. She found 
evidence that demonstrated regional parties had undergone a Europeanization effect. The 
formulation of positions on EU policy, participating in European-wide networks and 
organizations, and overall increased engagement in European activities all demonstrated 
a Europeanization effect on these regional parties. Furthermore, she found that EU and 
European issues were not affiliated with a particular ideology, and that these issues cut 
through the traditional left-right political dimensions of party competition. This allowed 
parties to advance their own interpretation of European policies and integration, aligning 
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their views of European issues with their party’s policy demands (Hepburn 2010, 20, 
195). 
 The accession of Poland into the EU on May 1st, 2004 was the most important 
event in Poland’s political history since the collapse of the Soviet Union. European 
integration in Poland has been described as a “return to Europe”, and the accession of 
Poland into the EU can be linked to the broader process of political transformation post-
communism in Poland (Klatt 2012, 14; Szczerbiak 2012, 9). Figure 1 presents the 
timeline of Poland’s ‘return to Europe’. EU membership was the realization of Poland’s 
return to Europe and reaffirmed its legitimate place in European politics. In Poland, the 
prospect of EU membership and was a reintegration into the West, giving Poland access 
to Western markets, investments, and financial services, and was viewed as a catalyst for 
greater standards of living. Unlike other countries, Poland initially did not view EU 
membership as a constraint on national sovereignty or independence.  
 Accession negotiations and the first years of EU membership were marked by 
problems, mostly based in the political competition of the ruling parties of the Polish 
government. The governments following the 1991 and 1993 general elections crafted 
Poland’s pro-Western and pro-European foreign policies, and subsequent governments 
continued these policies. The result of the 1997 elections saw the right wing Solidarity 
Electoral Action (AWS) grouping take control of the government from the post-
communist left Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). 
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Figure 1- Timeline of Poland and the Return to Europe 
Year 
1989 
Event 
Roundtable Talks 
 First Semi-Free Elections 
1990 PZPR dissolves after final congress 
1990 First free and open Presidential Elections 
1991 First free and open Parliamentary Elections 
1994 Poland’s application for EU membership submitted  
1997 EU Summit in Luxembourg- invitation to open accession negotiations 
extended to Poland, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, and Slovenia 
1998 Formal negotiations with ‘Luxembourg Group’ begin 
1999 Poland joins NATO 
2002 Negotiations between Poland and the EU finalized 
2003 Treaty for Accession signed 
 National Referendum in Poland passes with 77% approval for membership 
2004 Poland becomes Member of the EU 
2009 
2011 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) finalized  
Poland holds the Presidency of the Council of Europe 
2014 Former PM Donald Tusk becomes President of the European Council  
 
The SLD government, in coalition with the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), had submitted the 
formal application for EU membership in 1994. Over the next several years, the member 
states of the EU began planning on how to accommodate an Eastern enlargement. Poland 
was a particularly challenging hurdle, as it was the largest country seeking accession, 
both in size and population. These difficulties were also exacerbated by Poland’s 
backward agricultural sector, the structure of its economy, and disparity with EU norms 
(Szczerbiak 2012, 10-11). The AWS was not a formal political party, rather a fragmented 
and fractionalized grouping encompassing similar ideologies. The AWS also was in a 
coalition with the Freedom Union (UW) and the far right clerical-nationalist Christian 
National Union (ZChN) party, all led by Prime Minister Jerzy Buzek. Because of the 
anti-EU stances of the UW and ZChN, and a large Eurosceptic support base of the AWS, 
Buzek took a hardline approach and uncompromising stance to negotiations with the EU. 
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The result of this approach was a stalemate in EU accession negotiations, as Buzek tried 
to win over his coalitions base of support. 
 In the 2001 Elections, the AWS was defeated and the SLD returned to power. 
The SLD government, under PM Leszek Miller fulfilled its promise to speed up 
accession negotiations, granting major concessions to the EU on completing various 
chapters of the Copenhagen Criteria1. However, the 2001 Elections did give a rise to anti-
EU parties. Namely, Self Defense (SO) and the League of Polish Families (LPR), both 
won seats. These two parties would later spearhead the anti-membership campaign in the 
run up to the 2003 membership referendum. The SLD once again entered into a coalition 
government with the PSL. Before membership in the EU was finalized, two small hurdles 
in negotiations between Poland and the EU were worked out. Following an EU Summit 
in Copenhagen in 2002, news emerged that Poland would become a net contributor to the 
EU budget, because its accession would provoke a budget crisis in the EU. As a result, 
the Miller government took a tougher stance in the final phases of negotiations to ensure 
this was not the case. Secondly, a proposal from the EU Commission stating that post-
communist states would not receive full agricultural subsidies for the first nine years of 
membership created problems in Poland. Again the government had to take a hard line in 
negotiations over this proposal, because of Poland’s reliance on its agricultural sector. 
The base of the PSL’s support were Polish farmers, and as coalition partners with the 
SLD, were able to spur PM Miller into a tough stance. In the end, last minute agreements 
on the EU budget and support for agricultural subsidies allowed for accession 
negotiations to continue. Poland finished accession negotiations in 2002 and after the 
                                                 
1 The Copenhagen Criteria are the various chapters of the EU’s rules for accession.  
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sighing of the Treaty of Accession in 2003, the referendum on Polish membership passed 
with a margin of 77.54% to 22.55% (Szczerbiak 2012, 12-15).  
The accession negotiations and resulting referendum showed that Poland was a 
willing new member of the EU. With the support of its elites, as well as the public, 
Poland, (along with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia) became the newest member of the EU in 2004. The 
accession process showed that there was a considerably large segment of the population 
that was against membership in the EU and European integration, and this voice was 
represented in the government.   
 Aleks Szczerbiak, author of Poland within the European Union, wrote the most 
comprehensive account of the effect of Europeanization on the political parties of Poland. 
His study examined the effect European integration had on Poland’s parties during the 
first five years of membership. Using the framework developed by Robert Ladrech, 
Szczerbiak examined the six parties and political groupings that won the most seats in the 
parliamentary elections between 2001 and 2009. (Appendix A provides a table of Polish 
Parliamentary election results from 2001-2011). The six parties in his study were the 
Civic Platform (PO), Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), Law and Justice Party (PiS), the 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL), Self Defense (SO), and League of Polish Families (LPR).  
 The first part of Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization was to examine how 
European issues or developments emerged as issues of contestation in inter-party 
competition. Szczerbiak found that in the elections of 2005 and 2007, the role of the EU 
was largely diminished and was not a salient issue in terms of party competition. The one 
exception to this was the issue of the ratification of the European Constitution before the 
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2005 elections. However, after the Constitutional Treaty faced no votes in France and 
Spain, plans for a referendum in Poland were scrapped and EU issues took a back seat 
during the campaign. During the 2007 election, the EU issue again seemed to gain 
importance with infighting between the PO and PiS. However, it was not the issue of 
European integration that took center stage during the campaign. Rather, it was the issue 
of the government’s conduct of European policy, as the issues of Europe become 
assimilated in more general domestic debates (Szczerbiak 2012, 164-168).   
 The prominence of European issues in party programs, the second tenant of 
Ladrech’s framework, can be measured by examining the amount of space specifically 
devoted to European policy and the number of mentions of the EU in other sections of the 
party program that would previously have been considered the domain of domestic 
policies. Party programs in Poland fall into a political grey area. Party programs are 
“rarely reported in the media. They are almost never discussed by a political party’s rank 
and file, nor do party political activists contribute to their contents. They are also largely 
ignored by the party’s opponents… they are useful though…as they provide a snapshot of 
the state of mind of a party’s political leadership as it faces the votes” (Bobinski 2007, 4). 
Szczerbiak found that for the 2001, 2005, and 2007 elections, programs varied in length, 
and some parties did not produce or update their programs for successive elections. He 
found no link between the support or opposition to EU integration and the amount of 
space devoted to European policy in party programs. However, there was a trend across 
all party programs, to include more mentions of the EU and Europe in sections of the 
party programs that would have been considered in the domestic policies domain, 
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showing slight support for the Europeanization of parties in Poland in this realm 
(Szczerbiak 2012, 168-173). 
 The increased role of European integration on party organization was also 
minimal. Only two parties, the PO and SLD changed their party structures in response to 
EU membership. Both parties allowed their MEPs to participate in their party’s 
parliamentary caucus. The smallest impact of the EU on party organization was evident 
in the examples of PiS, the PSL, LPR, and SO. In these parties there was virtually no 
impact on the organization of the party after accession to the EU. Prior to accession, the 
PSL had a commission on international affairs and European integration, which ceased to 
exist once Poland became a member of the EU, and the forum for European integration 
was discontinued shortly after membership due to lack of interest (Szczerbiak 2012, 174-
176).  
 Finally, the impact of European transnational party influences was also not 
significant. The exceptions were the PO and the SLD, whose MEPs were part of large EP 
groupings. These parties also created links to domestic parties in other EU member states 
and transnational political groupings. The impact of European transnational influences 
was the smallest in relation to the PSL, SO, and LPR. During the time period of 
Szczerbiak’s study these parties had the smallest number of MEPs. Therefore, they did 
not create any significant transnational links. SO only had one MEP and he was not 
invited to join any EP party grouping. The PSL only had five MEPS, and their impact on 
creating transnational links did not go beyond joining an EP party group. The LPR, which 
did have ten representative in the EP, failed to make any meaningful transnational links. 
Due to political fighting within the LPR, the party split and with its MEPs. Some chose to 
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be non-aligned, and others joined more Euro-skeptic parties in the EP (Szczerbiak 2012, 
177-180).  
 The first five years of EU membership showed there was not a significant 
Europeanization effect on the political parties in Poland. The most prominent examples 
of Europeanization were in the PO and SLD, who were part of large EP groupings and 
sought to create transnational links with other parties in Europe. However, even with this 
in mind, the measurable impact of the EU on Polish parties was overall small. Party 
organizations remained largely unchanged and party programs did not cast European 
issues into a realm of great importance. Instead of being a realignment issue, membership 
in the EU was simply absorbed and assimilated into domestic policies. Instead of having 
a direct impact on the political parties, European integration and EU membership was 
subtle. Although the issue of the Constitutional Treaty was a significant source of 
political fighting between parties during the 2005 election, the failure of its ratification in 
Spain and France and dissolved the salience of the issue. Party patterns of activity and 
competition during the 2005 and 2007 elections remained largely unchanged in terms of 
EU membership.  
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Chapter 3 The Europeanization of Polish Political Parties 2009-2014 
 
 This chapter will examine the Europeanization of Polish political parties in the 
latter half of the first decade of Poland’s membership in the EU. Between 2009 and 2014, 
Poland held four elections, one for the presidency in 2010, legislative elections in 2011, 
and two EP Elections, in 2009 and 2014. (Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 show the results of these 
elections). This study will be similar to the one undertaken by Aleks Szczerbiak, although 
with some changes, most notably with the parties studied. PO, PiS, SLD, and PSL, which 
were profiled in Szczerbiak’s study, will again be examined. However, LPR and SO will 
not, as these parties are no longer represented in the legislature. Adding to the four parties 
mentioned above, Palikot’s Movement (RP), now called Your Movement (TR), will be 
examined, as well as the Congress of the New Right (KNP) and its successor parties, the 
Freedom and Justice Party (WiP), and the Coalition for the Renewal of the Republic- 
Freedom and Hope (KORWiN). Although the KNP is not represented in the Sejm, during 
the 2014 EU Parliamentary Election, it succeeded in sending four of its members to the 
EP. This chapter will examine some of the significant developments in the relationship 
between Poland and the EU from 2009 to 2014, then continue with an analysis using 
Robert Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization on the six above mentioned parties.     
 
Developments since 2009 
 
 The first decade of EU membership has been a successful one for Poland in 
economic terms. In the first ten years of membership, Poland was the largest single 
beneficiary of EU budget funds, receiving over EUR 61.4 Billion. This will remain 
unchanged for the EU budget period of 2014-2020. Despite mass cuts to the EU budget, 
 39
Poland has been earmarked over EUR 108 Billion, which will again make it the largest 
net beneficiary of funds. Over the first ten years of membership, Poland’s GDP grew 
close to 49%, and its GDP per capita has grown to be 67% of the EU average. Unlike all 
other EU member states, Poland avoided a recession in the fallout of the global financial 
crisis in 2009. Unemployment, though still high in the 14-15% range, has fallen since EU 
membership. So far, two million jobs have been created, and Poland was able to turn its 
trade-deficit into a trade-surplus (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2014, 11-17).  
 Politically, Poland has also shown itself to be an important actor in EU politics. In 
2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP), prepared by Poland, was officially launched. The 
EaP was the result of the 2004 Enlargement, as the borders of the EU moved farther east, 
brining them closer to the Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. The Central and Eastern 
European countries that ascended to the EU were the driving force behind the creation of 
the EaP, because of the sensitive relations between these countries and Russia, due to 
their collective Communist pasts. The EaP was also a result of the failure of the EU’s 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which was unsuccessful in fulfilling its objectives 
to the EU’s eastern neighbors. Unlike the ENP, which received its direction from the 
Commission, the EaP’s initiative will come directly from the Eastern EU member states. 
Poland’s place in the EaP is the fulfillment of its willingness to bring stability to Poland’s 
relationship with its eastern neighbors. With the launch of the EaP, an important 
cornerstone of Polish foreign policy has been implemented at the EU level (Klatt 2012, 
64-81).  
 Another significant development was Poland’s Presidency of the European 
Council in the second half of 2011. The presidency is responsible for the function of the 
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upper house of the EU legislature, the Council of the European Union. The presidency 
rotates to a different members state every six months. During the six-month term, the 
presidency chairs meetings at every level in the Council, ensuring continuity of the EU’s 
work in the Council, as well as allowing for the host nation to dictate EU agenda. 
Poland’s presidency focused on economic growth and closer relations with the EU’s 
eastern and southern neighbors. During Poland’s presidency, the negotiations for the 
2014-2020 were started, which were a catalyst for Poland’s success in negotiation for the 
largest outlay of EU budget funds (European Commission 2011; Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs 2012). The Polish Presidency was viewed very favorably by both the Polish 
public, with an 81.3% approval rating, and with members of the European Commission, 
with a 75.5% approval rating (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012, 184-186).  
 In December of 2014, former Prime Minister Donald Tusk became the second 
President of the European Council. The President of the European Council is the 
principal representative of the EU, and is the driving force behind the European Council, 
which is compromised of the heads of state of the member states. The appointment of the 
two term Prime Minister was seen by many as the culmination of Poland’s return to 
Europe. As Prime Minister, Tusk oversaw much of Poland’s integration with the EU 
between 2007 and 2014 (The Economist 2014). The Polish public sees the appointment 
of Tusk to the presidency as greatly beneficial and a positive development in Poland’s 
relation with the EU. According to a CBOS opinion poll conducted shortly after Tusks 
appointment, 62% of Poles thought that the appointment of Tusk would improve the 
image of Poland in Europe and in the world, 60% believed the appointment would better 
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represent Poland’s interest in the EU, and 52% believed that it would increase Poland’s 
influence on EU policy (CBOS 2014a, 2).  
 These developments show the substantial role that the EU has played in Poland 
both economically and politically, as well as the effect Poland has had on the EU. The 
Polish public seems to be aware of the larger role that the EU is playing in Poland, and 
overwhelmingly support for the EU in Poland is high. A CBOS poll taken at the ten-year 
anniversary of EU membership showed that 89% of Poles supported Poland’s 
membership in the EU, with 7% opposing it. CBOS polls on the perceived benefits of EU 
membership have been consistently rising. In 2004, 39% of respondents surveyed 
answered that EU membership brought more benefits than losses for Poland, and by 2014 
that figure rose to 62%. The ten year anniversary poll also showed that Poles 
overwhelmingly perceived the EU as a positive in terms of aiding the Polish economy, 
agricultural sector, roads and infrastructure, and environmental concerns (CBOS 2014b, 
1-5).  
Domestic developments in Poland between 2009 and 2014 saw four elections.  
The 2010 Presidential Election. President Bronislaw Komorowski, former Marshal of the 
Sejm, won the election after a second round run-off vote. Komorowski had been acting 
president following the death of President Lech Kaczynski in the Polish Air Force crash 
in Smolensk, Russia. Komorowski ran against nine other challengers, including PiS 
candidate Janusz Kaczynski2. The 2010 Presidential election brought to an end a period 
of cohabitation in Poland’s political structure, as the head of state had been a member of 
the opposition party in the Sejm. The presidential campaign was mostly characterized by 
                                                 
2 Janusz Kaczynski is the twin brother of former President Lech Kaczynski.  
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fighting between the PO and PiS. Economic and left-right socio-cultural issues took 
center stage. Foreign policy issues, which usually are an important facet of electoral 
competition in Poland, were not as salient during this election. EU issues played an even 
smaller role during the election, even with a small political controversy having taken 
place in 2008. Both the president and prime minister traveled to a EU summit in October 
of 2008, after disagreements between the legislature and the executive that fell on party 
lines. The PO, which controlled the Sejm, felt that Prime Minister Tusk should represent 
Poland at the summit, while President Kaczynski, member of the opposition party PiS, 
felt that he was the rightful representative of Poland in EU matters. However, by the 
campaign, this disagreement was largely forgotten, as the death of President Kaczynski 
overshadowed many issues areas (Rosset 2011, 241-243). 
 
Table 3- 2010 Presidential Election 
Candidate 
Bronislaw Komorowski 
Party 
PO 
1st Round 
41.54% 
2nd Round  
53.01% 
Jaroslaw Kaczynski PiS 36.46% 46.99% 
Grzegorz Napieralski SLD 13.68% - 
Janusz Korwin-Mikke WiP 2.48% - 
Waldemar Pawlak PSL 1.75% - 
National Electoral Commission- Presidential Election The Republic of Poland (2010) 
  
 The Polish Parliamentary Election of 2011 resulted with the PO remaining in 
power and PiS keeping its position as the main opposition party. The 2011 election was 
also significant in that it saw the return of the SLD. The SLD suffered major electoral 
defeats following a litany of corruption scandals in the mid 2000s. 2011 also saw a new 
party, Palikot’s Movement (PR), gain a respective number of seats. The election of PR to 
the Sejm was the first time a new party had won seats in a parliamentary election since 
SO in 2001. The Smolensk tragedy had divided Poland based on party lines heavily in the 
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run up to the 2011 election. Some commentators referred to it as the ‘Polish-Polish War’. 
PiS had painted itself as an anti-system party, with a primacy of interests during the 
campaign based in cultural and social issues. The effects of the 2009 financial crisis, and 
the multitude of crises in the Euro-zone did play a significant role in the campaign. This 
steady stream of bad news was most detrimental to the governing PO majority in the 
Sejm. PiS used the PO’s pro-European stance and attacked it. During the 2011 election, 
PiS positioned itself as a more euro-skeptic party. The base of its supporters was more 
religious and anti-EU integrationist. PiS radicalization ended up being its downfall. 
Although the PO lost seats from the previous election, it received the largest share of 
votes and was able to form a majority coalition with the PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 617-619).  
 
Table 4- 2011 General Election Results 
Party 
Civic Platform (PO) 
% 
39.2 
Seats 
207 
Law and Justice (PiS) 29.9 157 
Palikot’s Movement (RP) 10.0 40 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 8.4 28 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 8.2 27 
German Minority 0.2 1 
www.electionresources.org/pl/sejm.php?election=2011 
               
 The period between 2009 and 2014 also included two Elections for the EP. In the 
2009 EP election, the PO won the largest share of votes and was awarded half of 
Poland’s seats. PiS came in second with 15 seats, and the SLD and PSL split the 
remaining seats seven to three respectively. The turnout for the 2009 elections was low, 
especially when compared to the rest of the EU, with only 20.87% of eligible voters 
taking part in the election (European Parliament 2014b). The 2014 European elections 
were a stark contrast to the 2009 elections, both in Poland and abroad. The 2014 election 
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saw a rise and a surge of support for Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties. In total, 212 of the 
751 seats in the EP were awarded to Eurosceptic parties, with the largest Eurosceptic 
parties winning votes in Greece, Spain, the UK, France, Denmark, and Lithuania. The 
surge of support for these parties cannot simply be seen as a protest vote against 
unpopular governments. Rather, the rise of these parties signaled a large contingent of the 
EU electorate that is worried about the deepening of European integration. The worries 
over Eastern European immigration into Western Europe, the anxieties caused by 
financial crises, and voters who feel that mainstream parties don’t adequately represent 
them, are all factors in the large victories for Eurosceptic parties. Although these parties 
hold 28% of the seats in the EP, for now they have been effectively marginalized and are 
unlikely to play a pivotal role in EU policy-making (Treib 2014, 1542-1551).  
In the 2014 EP Election in Poland, 25 of the 51 MEP seats were awarded to the 
PO and the SLD. PiS, which can be viewed as a soft Eurosceptic party, won 19 seats. The 
real anti-EU voice came with the KNP’s victor of four seats. The PSL won the remaining 
four seats (PKW 2014). Just as in 2009, the 2014 EP elections had a low turnout rate, 
with only 23.83% of eligible votes casting ballots (European Parliament 2014b). Overall, 
voters’ interest in EP elections are low, as illustrated by the low turnouts in both 
elections. Furthermore, a CBOS poll indicated that Polish voters view the EP elections as 
the least important elections in their country. Only 32% of respondents surveyed before 
the 2014 election expressed any interest in voting in the upcoming election (CBOS 
2014c). In addition, the Polish public also has an overwhelmingly negative opinion of the 
MEPs. The CBOS found that 52% of Poles believe that the MEPs have little work to do, 
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and 47% do not believe that MEPs sufficiently defend Poland’s interests in the EP 
(CBOS 2014c; 2014d).        
 
Table 5- 2009 EU Parliament Election Results 
Party 
Civic Platform (PO) 
% 
44.4 
Seats 
25 
Law and Justice (PiS) 27.4 15 
Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP) 12.3 7 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 7.01 3 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/mobile-country-pl-2009.html 
 
Table 6- 2014 EU Parliament Election Results 
Party 
Civic Platform (PO) 
% 
32.1 
Seats 
19 
Law and Justice (PiS) 31.8 19 
Democratic Left Alliance- Labor Union (SLD-UP) 9.4 5 
Congress of the New Right (KNP) 7.2 4 
Polish Peasant Party (PSL) 6.8 4 
www.eurparl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/country-results-pl-2014.html 
 
 With these developments and the results of the four Polish elections, the next 
section will undertake an analysis of the PO, PiS, SLD, PSL, KNP, and TR. Using Robert 
Ladrech’s framework, the parties studied will show whether Poland’s political parties 
have been Europeanized during the second five years of Polish EU membership.   
Analysis of Polish Political Parties  
 
 The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) is the successor party of the former 
communist ruling PZPR. After the dissolution of the PZPR many of its members went on 
to found the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP), which then became the 
SLD. From 1991 to 2001, the SLD was one of the strongest parties in Poland, before 
corruption scandals led to political downturn in the 2005 election. In 2007, the party 
entered into the Left and Democracy (LiD) grouping with several other leftist parties, 
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before leaving the group in 2008. The SLD has always presented a pro-Western and pro-
EU front, and the party was the main driver in securing EU membership. The SLD has 
always supported full economic and political integration of Poland with the EU, as well 
as supported a federal model of European integration (Castle and Taras 2002, 117-118; 
Szczerbiak 2012, 154-156). Although scandals in the SLD led to a PiS controlled 
coalition government after the 2005 Elections, the SLD remained an important player in 
Poland’s EU politics. In the 2009 EP election, the SLD secured seven seats, and in 2014 
it was able to keep five. In the EP, the SLD’s MEPs are grouped with the Socialists & 
Democrats European Political Group.   
 The SLD continues to be the most pro European integration party in Poland. It’s 
party program, “Tomorrow with Confidence”, is a 228-page document outline the goals 
and visions of the SLD for Poland. The program covers the areas of domestic, foreign 
policy, and economic affairs. The SLD provides the most comprehensive example of a 
party has fully integrated itself into EU structures. Throughout the course of the 
document, over 100 references are made to the EU and European integration, including a 
separate twelve-page chapter dedicated to Polish-EU relations. In the realm of domestic 
affairs, the SLD program calls for the advancement of Polish domestic polices, ranging 
from economic to cultural and social dimensions through deeper integration with the EU. 
The program contains numerous mentions of the inequality, economic and social, 
between the rest of the EU and Poland (SLD 2011, 1-13). It calls for a deep integration of 
the Polish budget with that of the EU, full integration of Poland into the Schengen 
Agreement, and united EU-Polish immigration policy (ibid, 27-39). The SLD also 
advocates for improvements in the agricultural sector through use of the Common 
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Agricultural Policy (CAP) funds, the expansion and integration of rail and maritime 
structures to existing EU structures, and the integration of the Polish military with the EU 
and NATO (ibid, 45-72).   
 In the foreign policy dimensions, the SLD program calls for a three-pillared 
approach for Poland. “Poland within the EU must follow a progressive model with which 
it can make possible the creation of an international governance structure, with a sense of 
responsibility and responsibility towards the millions of citizens of Europe” (ibid, 79-80). 
The three pillar approach advocated by the SLD is that Poland be politically aligned with 
Europe, secure the harmonious relations between itself and the rest of the Central and 
Eastern European states, and ensure the continued participation of Poland within the 
transatlantic security structures (ibid, 76). The program also calls for the immediate 
ratification of the European Fundamental Rights Charter, which has so far not been 
presented to the Sejm for approval.  
 The SLD’s link with transnational political groups within the EU is highlighted 
with co-publishing of a EU party program with its EP partner, the Socialists & Democrats 
and the Party of European Socialists (PES), ahead of the 2014 EP elections. This 
program, entitled “In the Direction of a New Europe”, is a twelve-page document that 
highlights many of the ideas found in the SLD’s 2011 program. The program calls for a 
greater integration of the EU with its member states, including the strengthening of 
existing EU structures. Among many other issues, the program advocates for gender 
equality rights of EU workers, calls for financial institutions and reforms aimed at 
improving the lives of EU citizens, calling for greater implementations of 
environmentally friendly policies, and greater democracy within the EU (PES 2014, 1-
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12). The SLD has also held conferences with the PES, on a range of issues, such as the 
PES & SLD Poland Conference on Gender Equality, held on March 7th, 2015.  
 The SLD has also minimally changed its party organization structures based on its 
membership in the Socialist & Democrats EP Grouping. The National Board of the SLD 
elects the representatives (MEPs) that will join the Socialist & Democrats in the EP, and 
the SLD created the position of Delegation Coordinator for the Polish Delegation to the 
Parliamentary Group of the Progressive Socialists & Democrats3. However, in terms of a 
greater role for EU specialists, no roles have been created, nor has party organization 
been changed on this front. The final aspect of the Ladrech framework, the effect of 
European integration on inter-party competition is also not as evident when analyzing the 
SLD. Following the 2005 corruption scandals, the SLD’s role in the Sejm greatly 
diminished. In the 2010 Presidential Election, the SLD’s candidate, Grzegorz 
Napieralski, received just shy of 14% of the vote in the first round. The SLD’s campaign 
focused on social and welfare issues, but the campaign was dominated by the competition 
between the PO and PiS. In the end, the SLD did not support either the PO or PiS 
candidate in the second round (Rosset 2011, 241,243). During the 2011 parliamentary 
elections, the SLD was able to secure only 8.2% of the vote, fiving it 27 seats in the 
Sejm. The aftermath of the Smolensk crash and political fighting between the PO and PiS 
once again took center stage. Many of its ‘economically left’ voters left to support PiS, 
and its socially left leaning and young voters went on the support Palikot’s Movement 
(PR) (Tworzecki 2011, 618-620).  
                                                 
3 From the SLD website- http://www.sld.org.pl/strony/5-struktura_krajowa.html 
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 The Polish Peasant Party (PSL) has been a relative small party in Poland, but 
nevertheless an important one. The PSL has been a minority partner to the PO led 
coalition government since 2007. The Polish Peasant party is another post-communist 
successor party, to the United Peasant Party (ZSL), a loyal communist satellite party. The 
base of the PSL’s support comes from the rural and agricultural sectors of Poland’s 
population (Castle and Taras 2002, 141-143). Aleks Szczerbiak described the PSL as 
having an ambivalent approach towards European integration. The PSL’s rural and 
agricultural ties have always positioned the party as taking a tougher stance on EU 
negotiations, in order to secure the best possible outcome for Poland’s farmers. After the 
PSL joined in coalition with the PO, its stance on EU membership and integration 
softened, and in many cases the party does not present any meaningful dialogue in terms 
of the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 157-158).  
 The PSL is a party that falls into the ‘grey area’ of party programs. Although the 
PSL publishes a party program for all elections, the programs amounts to only small 
variations in message from previous party programs. The PSL party program is usually 
shorter than most other parties. In preparation for the 2011 elections, the party program 
published by the PSL was a simple 23-page document. The program contains exactly 
three mentions of the EU, two of which deal with the CAP policies and funds. The third 
mention of the EU comes when the PSL discusses energy policy, stating, “the 
development of renewable energy sources must be linked to Poland’s obligation with the 
EU” (PSL 2011, 17). The only other mention of a transnational body is the PSL’s 
commitment to Poland’s security through the continued membership of Poland in NATO 
(ibid, 21-23). The rest of the program includes no mentions of the EU or European 
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integration. Domestic and foreign policies are discussed in a limited fashion, and the bulk 
of the program is reserved for highlighting the PSL’s continued support of Poland’s 
agricultural producers. The PSL did publish party programs for the EP Elections in 2009 
and 2014. The 2009 program was 24 pages long, and resolved a common theme of 
recognizing the desirability of EU integration, but also striving to ensure the 
“preservation of identity and of Poland” as the most important position to take in the EU 
(PSL 2009, 1-2). The bulk of the 2009 program focuses on the role of the Polish 
agricultural sector and the importance of CAP funds to Polish farmers. The goal of the 
PSL in the EP is to support the comprehensive socio-economic development of Poland in 
relation to the rest of the EU, and the leveling of difference in development (PSL 2009, 8-
10). The PSL also states their intention of consolidating the “essential European and 
Christian values”, namely the principals of “peaceful development, human and civil 
rights, democracy, solidarity, justice, and the dignity of all persons” (PSL 2009, 10). The 
2014 PSL EP program, at only four pages, offers some of the same themes from the 2009 
program. Regional development, particularly that of Poland’s agricultural sector, 
dominates the discussion in the program. In terms of European integration, the PSL 
contends that it is open to further integration, but with respect to a Polish identity (PSL 
2014, 1-4).  
 European integration has had little effect on the electoral competition of the PSL. 
The PSL has had an important role in the Polish governments, having been a junior 
partner in ruling coalitions from 1991 to 1997, 2001 to 2003, and from 2007 to today. 
Following the 2005 elections, the PSL took a pro-European stance and has continued to 
do since in subsequent years. The PSL takes a more cautious tone when discussing 
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certain EU matters, such as the adoption of the Euro, generally the party favors deeper 
integration with the EU. It’s position as junior coalition partner with the pro-European 
PO, has also had its effects on the party’s position on the EU (Szczerbiak 2012, 155-157). 
In the 2010 elections, the PSL was represented by Waldemar Pawlak, but he secured less 
than 2% of the vote in the first round. During this election, as well as the legislative 
election of 2011, the PSL lost substantial portions of its vote to PiS. However, both the 
presidential and legislative elections showed a continued support of Poland’s rural and 
agricultural vote (Rosset 2011; Tworczecki 2012).  
    During the first five years of EU membership, the PSL had no significant party 
organizational change due to EU membership. This also continued in the years between 
2009 and 2014. In 2009 the PSL was able to secure three seats in the EP and in 2014 it 
secured four. The extent to which the PSL works with its EP grouping is the addition of a 
link to its EP Group, the European People’s Party, a center-right Christian Democratic 
party grouping.  
 The Civic Platform (PO) has held the presidency since 2010 and has been the 
ruling the Sejm since the 2007 elections. The PO was the former party of European 
Council President Donald Tusk. Throughout its history the PO has been a staunch 
supporter of the EU and further EU integration, with few exceptions. Outside of its 
opposition to the Constitutional Treaty and its critical stance against the Belka 
government over the 2007-2013 EU budget (when it was a minority party), the PO has 
been ardently pro-European. It has called for deeper integration, and has called for the 
EU to be more than an agreement between states, but rather a community. Between 2004 
and 2009, the PO expanded its links with its EP grouping, as well as creating links 
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between like-minded political parties in Germany. It has always advocated for Polish 
foreign policy to be centered around Europe, and in recent elections, it stance on Europe 
has been in contrast to its main opposition party PiS (Szczerbiak 2012, 143-146). 
 The last party program published by the PO was for the 2011 election, as the party 
has switched to dedicating its party positions on policy issues through the use of its 
website. The 2011 programs is a 194-page document on various issues. Although the PO 
has always been a supporter of the EU, its party program differed greatly from that of the 
SLD in this regard. In the 194 pages, the EU or European integration is mentioned over 
twenty-five times, but unlike the program of the SLD, the main areas the EU is addressed 
is during foreign policy, environmental, security issues, and the negotiations for the 
2014-2020 EU Budget. Most mentions of domestic policies that make mention of the EU, 
do so in regards to how the PO would use EU funds to complete their objectives (PO 
2011, 56-188). The 2011 general election was a hotly contested competition between the 
PO and PiS. Because of this, the PO might have found it more prudent to focus on 
domestic policies and how it deviated from the positions of PiS.  
 As was previously noted, the 2010 Presidential elections, and to some degree, the 
2011 general elections were marred by the Smolensk tragedy that had claimed the lives of 
President Kaczynski and 95 others. Early on in the 2010 campaign, public opinion 
polling showed that PO’s candidate Bronislaw Komorowski and PiS’ candidate Janusz 
Kaczynski were the frontrunners for the presidency. With neither side wanting to be 
viewed as taking advantage of the Smolensk tragedy, the presidential campaign focused 
on each candidate’s personal and presidential attributes. No substantive debates over 
policy occurred, as both sides avoided strong stances. The little debate there was focused 
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on economic and socio-cultural issues. EU relations and integration also played a very 
minor role in the campaign. The result was a second round victory for the PO, and 
Komorowski was elected president (Rosset 2011, 242-243). The 2011 general election 
was a much more polarizing one than the presidential election a year earlier. PiS general 
strategy was the attack the PO’s close ties with the EU and support for further integration. 
In response the PO took credit for steering the countries economy away from recession, 
as had been the case in most of the EU member states. The PO’s main strategy was to 
convince Polish voters not to change parties amidst a global financial crisis. In the end, 
PO emerged victorious gaining the most seats in the Sejm with 207, and together with he 
PSL’s 27 seats was able to form a governing coalition once again (Tworczecki 2012, 
618-620).  
 The PO’s organization changed immensely following the accession of Poland into 
the EU. With these changes were also the creation of transnational links between the PO, 
its EP grouping, and other parties in EU member states. First, the PO’s MEPs became 
immediately active in their EP caucuses, and they were also made de facto members of 
the PO’s regional and national boards. The PO also created the position of Deputy 
Secretary of International Affairs, serving as a link between the PO, the MEPs, and the 
PO’s sister parties in other member states (Szczerbiak 2012, 174). The PO’s 19 MEPs are 
part of the European People’s Party group. The PO is also active with pan-European 
Christian Democratic parties, most recently sending 57 delegates to the EPP Congress in 
Dublin, Ireland4.  
                                                 
4 http://www.platforma.org/aktualnosc/34997/kongres-epp-w-dublinie 
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 The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was formed in 2001 by the Kaczynski twins. 
From its founding, the parties attitude towards the EU and European integration was 
more uncertain and not as well defined. PiS leadership from the very onset of EU 
membership had had a distrust of the EU as an organization. For the first five years of 
membership, PiS was part of the anti-federalist and Eurosceptic Union for a Europe of 
Nations EP grouping. PiS has always stressed a vision of the EU as a community, with 
the national sovereignty and solidarity of nations taking precedent over the EU. In other 
areas, such as increasing the EU budget and CAP funds, PiS advocated for deeper 
European integration (Szczerbiak 2012, 147-154). Following the 2009 EP elections, PiS 
joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Grouping, which included members 
of the Conservative Party in the UK, the Civic Democratic Party from the Czech 
Republic, among others. This program of this group was based on the so-called Prague 
Declaration. The Prague Deceleration outlines the principles of the European 
Conservatives and Reformist Group, including reforming the EU based on Eurorealism, 
which included a respect of national sovereignty of members tastes, importance of the 
family, opposition of EU federalism, controlled immigration, and an end to wasteful and 
excessive bureaucracy in the EU5. Though its EP grouping, PiS has created substantial 
transnational networks among EU member states.        
 PiS’ party programs are always the lengthiest. The program for the 2009 EP and 
2010 presidential elections was a staggering 216 pages and for the 2011 general elections 
256 pages. The 2009/2010 election program made numerous references to the EU and to 
European integration. The common theme throughout was that Polish sovereignty and 
                                                 
5 http://www.pis.org.pl/unit.php?o=pis_na_swiecie 
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solidarity had to be protected above else. “The formation of external relations will be 
based on realism… Polish membership in the European Union cannot mean giving up 
sovereignty or violate the supremacy of the Polish Constitution” (PiS 2009, 172). All 
issues areas in regards to the EU followed logically from this premise. The main theme 
being that European integration was not bad, but it had to be done without compromising 
Polish sovereignty. PiS also stated that democracy is only possible within the framework 
of a nation-state, and that at the EU is not capable of being a true democratic institution 
(PiS 2009, 68-73).  
The 2011 program describes PiS as a construct of several “political trends related 
to the ideas of Christian-democracy, Catholic-nationalism, and conservatism… 
Invariably, Christian values shape the identity and the culture of Poland and have done so 
for over a thousand years” (PiS 2011, 7). This focus on religiosity became a main feature 
of PiS campaigns. During the 2011 Election especially, PiS attempted to create a clear 
ideological and cultural distinction (the Polish-Polish War), between itself and the PO. 
The socially and culturally far right placement of the PiS during the election ultimately 
failed as a strategy, as PO remained in power (Tworzecki 2011, 619-620). The EU did 
not play a significant role in the 2011 Election, and this is reflected in the party program. 
In all 256 pages, the EU is mentioned only 56 times. Most mentions to the EU are the 
same as in the 2009 program, with integration favored in terms of security and the EU 
budget, but with the sovereignty of Poland of most importance.  
The SLD, PSL, PO, and PiS are the prime political forces in Poland. These parties 
have dominated the political landscape in Poland since its accession to the EU. However 
there have been two new political movements of note. Palikot’s Movement (RP) founded 
 56
in 2011 and renamed Your Movement (TR) in 2013, is a political party created by Janusz 
Palikot, a former PO politician. RP’s electoral strategy was to gain the support of a wide 
variety of groups that had not been represented by any previous party. PR positioned 
itself as an anti-clerical party, seeking to end privileged status enjoyed by the Catholic 
Church, supported feminist and LGBT causes, as well as the legalization of Marijuana. 
RP was able to win 10% of the vote in 2011 Election, enough to give it 40 seats in the 
Sejm, more than the SLD and PSL (Tworzecki 2012, 619-620).  
During the 2014 EP Elections, TR banded with other small left leaning parties to 
form the Europa Plus-Your Movement Group, but the alliance failed to get the minimum 
5% threshold vote for representation and disbanded shortly after the election. The party 
did publish an online program stating its party views. Overall the party can be described 
as being generally pro-European (Thompson 2013, 328-329). TR maintains a three part 
party program on its website entitled “Modern State, Secular State, Friendly State”, 
which consist of one hundred articles defining the party’s ideology. The EU and 
European integration is mentioned eight times in this document. Most notably, TR calls 
for the creation of a European Federation and for the wider and deeper integration of the 
Euro-zone with immediate adoption of the Euro in Poland (TR, 68-69). TR also calls for 
the integration of EU standards and policies in the areas of gender and pay equality, 
energy efficiency, and the adoption of the EU Fundamental Human Rights Charter (TR, 
10-48). Following the failure of the Europa Plus Group to win any seats in the EP, TR 
has not been active in any transnational of EP groupings.  
The 2014 EP Election did show that there is a strong anti-EU presence in Poland. The 
Congress of the New Right (KNP), led by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, was able to secure four 
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seats to the MEP. Korwin-Mikke, who has participated in every presidential election 
since 1989, is ardently anti-EU and during his campaign promised to “blow up the EU 
from within” (Szczerbiak 2015). The KNP was a successor party to the equally right 
wing and anti-EU Liberty and Rule of Law Party (WiP), which participated in the 2010 
presidential elections with Korwin-Mikke as its candidate. The party only garnered 2.5% 
of the vote in the first round. In 2015, Korwin-Mikke was expelled from the KNP and 
formed yet another party, the Coalition of the Polish Republic’s Renewal Freedom and 
Hope (KORWiN). Korwin-Mikke was joined by one other KNP EP, giving KORWiN 
two seats on the EP. In the EP, KORWiN and all but one member of the KNP are not 
attached to a EP grouping. The sole KNP member aligned with an EP grouping is part of 
the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy, a self proclaimed Eurosceptic political 
grouping. KORWiN has not published any party program materials. The KNP offers a 
three-part document that articulates its positions. Each part is simply on page of positions 
and fundamental principles of the KNP. The KNP promises to “end the mindless 
subordination to the Brussels bureaucracy” and to “restore the EU to its original 
intention, as an area of free trade and free movement of people”. Further, the KNP’s 
ideological declaration states “Polish sovereignty is a fundamental political value” 
(KNP).        
 
Conclusion  
 
 The above analysis examined the Europeanization effect on Poland’s political 
parties using Robert Ladrech’s framework. The first part of the framework, examining 
political party programs showed that there is a great deal of variation between Poland’s 
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parties. The SLD seems to be the most Europeanized in this sense. Affairs from domestic 
to foreign are all integrated along side EU frameworks and European integration. The 
PSL, true to its agrarian and rural roots, had minimal references to the EU. Most 
references to the EU were not along the lines of integration, but rather dealt with various 
provisions of the EU Budget and CAP. PO, KNP, and TR showed that parties are moving 
away from publishing formal electoral programs, relying on the use of their websites to 
articulate their party’s positions. The PO’s 2011 party program articulates a greater 
integration of EU and integration matters, but not to the extent of the SLD program. EU 
issues and integration policies are primarily concentrated in the programs foreign policy, 
environmental, and security issues. PiS’ numerous and lengthy party programs articulate 
a theme of Polish sovereignty before furthered European integration. Though the PiS is 
not anti-EU, its approach to EU issues and integration is as a Eurorealist party. It accepts 
the EU as an institution and the benefits Poland receives through the various EU funds, 
but it maintains the primacy of Polish sovereignty. Integration of EU matters into 
domestic matters is very limited. Although the party program of the TR makes few 
references to the EU, it advocates for deeper integration with calls for a European 
Federation, as well as the immediate adoption of the Euro as Poland’s currency. Finally, 
the short (or in the case of KORWiN non existing) party program of the KNP mainly 
illustrates the party’s belief in a limited EU and a fully sovereign Poland.  
 In the dimension of inter-party competition, the period between 2009 and 2014 
was not incredibly focused on the issues of European integration. Arguable the most pro-
EU party in Poland, the SLD, spent much of this five-year period fighting for its political 
life after years of corruption scandals marred the party. The PSL, which has enjoyed the 
 59
position of ruling coalition partner since 2007, has not based its campaigns on EU or 
integration issues. If the PSL has gone under any significant change in party competition, 
it has been in softening its stance towards the EU because of its continued partnership 
with the PO. The PO and PiS have dominated the political landscape in Poland since 
2007. The competition between these two parties has defined the political system. In the 
aftermath of the Smolensk tragedy, the 2010 and 2011 elections were predominantly free 
of EU issues. The two parties focused their campaigns on domestic, socio-cultural, and 
candidate issues.  
 In the final two dimensions of Ladrech’s framework, the effect of party 
organization and the establishment of transnational links remain uneven between parties. 
The PO has undergone the most significant changes in its party organization and through 
the creation of links with other national parties, its EP grouping, and the incorporation of 
EU specialists and its MEPs into the domestic party structure. The SLD has expanded its 
links with its EP party groupings as well as with other national parties. Its party structure 
has had minimal changes due to European integration. The PSL’s party organization 
remains unchanged, and it has not made any considerable efforts of creating transnational 
links. Although PiS has made significant links with its EP grouping and other 
conservative parties across the EU, its party organization and structure remain 
unchanged. The anti-EU parties, KNP and KORWiN, and the new TR, also show no 
changes in party structure or the formation of transnational links. 
 Aleks Szczerbiak concluded that the first five years of Polish membership in the 
EU had not had a significant Europeanization effect on parties. The results of this study 
show that Europeanization as a result of European integration is mixed at best. The SLD 
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remains the most fervent pro-EU and European integration party, and offers the best 
example of a party that fulfills almost Ladrech’s entire framework of Europeanization. 
The PO would be a close second to the SLD, in that it has moved its party organizational 
structure and created meaningful links with its transnational partners. The main 
conclusion of the application of Ladrech’s framework to Polish parties show that they 
vary in how they are integrated on each dimension of the framework. PiS for example, 
has built meaningful transnational ties, but has not altered its party organization and its 
approach to European integration is one of extreme caution. The rise of anti-EU parties 
(KNP and KORWiN), also highlight the frameworks inadequacy in examining these 
parties. The parties unwillingness to create transnational links, join EP groupings, or to 
publish party programs makes them hard to classify under Ladrech’s framework, even 
through it could be argued that these parties have been substantially Europeanized, 
although in an anti-EU direction. One other significant explanatory in why European 
integration has been slow in Europeanizing Poland’s parties is the way party competition 
has evolved since 2005. Since the 2005 election, Poland’s elections, both presidential and 
legislative, have been centered on the competition between the PO and PiS. Though other 
parties have been able to secure seats, these two political forces have dominated 
campaigns. The EU as a non-issue in the 2010 and 2011 elections can be seen as a result 
of this two-party competition.  
 The EU and European integration has certainly become a dimension of political 
competition in Poland. Each party has a clear position on the issue, but most European 
issues in Poland have been overshadowed. The most salient EU issues regardless of party 
have been that of the EU budget and security concerns. Budgetary and security issues are 
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the most well integrated into the platforms of each party. Outside of these two areas, EU 
issues have not become a realigning or even central feature of the political system in 
Poland. Although parties have incorporated various EU policies and structures into their 
organization in various ways, it is not enough to conclude that Polish parties have been 
Europeanized.  
More research will have to be done in Poland, and in other member states.   
For future research, Ladrech’s framework of Europeanization must be amended to better 
understand how European integration has affected political parties in member states. 
Although Ladrech’s framework presents viable dimensions for research, it must be 
changed to more accurately reflect the process of Europeanization of political parties. 
One important addition to the aspect of Europeanization of political parties must be 
added to better reflect the dynamic between parties and their roles in democracies. 
Samuel Eldersveld outlined six crucial roles that parties play in democracies. These party 
functions include “(1) control and recruitment of elites, (2) interest aggregation, (3) 
conflict management, (4) competition maximization, (5) policy innovation, and (6) 
socializing citizens to a system consensus” (Yesilada 2002, 125). The sixth role, that of 
the party’s function in socializing citizens to a system consensus, would be key in further 
understanding the Europeanization effect on political parties. Within the confides of 
Ladrech’s framework, it would be difficult to extrapolate this link. The evidence provided 
in this study focused on the ways in which the EU and European integration had a distinct 
effect on political parties in Poland through changes in party structure and organization, 
the salience of EU issues in party programs, inter-party competition, and ties between 
transnational parties and EP groupings. The processes identified by Ladrech focus on 
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these narrow categories. Further research will have to include a discussion and research 
on if, and how, parties are socializing their citizens to a consensus on issues of European 
integration.                        
 This study is a stepping-stone to greater understanding of political party behavior 
in relation to EU membership. Robert Ladrech’s framework allows for a structural 
understanding of Europeanization, but it leaves questions unanswered. Mainly, issues of 
how parties socialize their constituents to EU membership and integration remain 
unclear. Researching only one EU member state also does not provide a full 
comprehensive understanding of the issue of Europeanization. Though Poland has always 
been a willing partner in the EU project and its citizens overwhelmingly support EU 
membership, Poland is unique in that it is a relatively recent member, and differs from 
other EU members. The EU consists of over 500 million citizens in 28 member states. 
Although the EU has been most important to member states in economic and security 
realms, the EU also strives to become an important social actor. The objectives of the EU 
include goals of establishing European citizenship, ensure freedom and justice, and 
promote social progress. The social aspects of the EU also further expand the definition 
of Europeanization by introducing the question of what EU citizenship and social 
progress mean. Adding dimensions of European values and ideals will undoubtedly 
create a different meaning of Europeanization and how it effects domestic politics of 
member states. By employing Ladrech’s framework and building upon the work of Aleks 
Szczerbiak, Europeanization of Poland’s political parties yields limited and mixed results. 
Further research and study will hopefully make issues of Europeanization clearer and 
illustrate how the EU changes the politics of its member states.  
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Appendix A- Election Results 2001-2014 
 
 
Sejm Election Results, Prime Ministers, and Coalition Governments 
                                                             2001-2014 
 
Party Seats Prime Minister Coalition 
2001 Elections 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 216 Leszek Miller (01-04) SLD-UP-PSL 
Civic Platform (PO) 65 
Self Defense (SO) 53 
Law and Justice (PiS) 44 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 42 Marek Belka (04-05) SLD-UP 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 38 
German Minority 2 
2005 Election 
Law and Justice (PiS) 155 Kazimeriz Marinkiewicz 
(05-06) 
PiS-SO-LPR 
Civic Platform (PO) 133 
Self Defense (SO) 56 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 55 
League of Polish Families (LPR) 34 Jaroslaw Kaczynski (06-07) 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 25 
German Minority 2 
2007 Election 
Civic Platform (PO) 209 Donald Tusk PO-PSL 
Law and Justice (PiS) 166 
Left and Democracy (LiD) 53 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 31 
German Minority 1 
2011 Election 
Civic Platform (PO) 207 Donald Tusk (09-14) PO-PSL 
Law and Justice (PiS) 157 
Palikot’s Movement (RP) 40 
Polish Peasants Party (PSL) 28 Ewa Kopacz (14-present) PO-PSL 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) 27 
German Minority 1 
www.electionresources.org/pl/sejm.php 
 
